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Beyond Bed and Bread:
Making the African State through
Marriage Law Reform - Constitutive




In most African countries formerly under British rule, marriage
defined the colonial state in two important respects. Between 1850
and 1930, declarations by colonial courts that African customary
marriages were invalid because they were not conceptually identical
to English marriages opened the way for colonial governments to
assume and exercise territorial authority. Proponents of colonialism
assumed that African and English land tenure concepts were
similarly irreconcilable, which justified expropriation and
displacement. Between 1930 and 1960, important changes in
international law and local resistance to colonialism influenced
colonial law to recognize customary marriages as valid and
customary land tenure as worthy of protection. Despite this shift,
colonial governments, however, maintained that the English form of
marriage was superior and offered incentives for conversion of
customary marriages. The formal recognition of both forms of
marriage therefore only ushered in an era of competitive and
disharmonious coexistence, creating systemic problems and great
need for state-directed marriage law reform.
Part II of this article argues that colonial era adjudication of
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marriage validity forms was an important exercise of colonial
authority not only because formal distinctions of marriage forms
that resulted entrenched colonial territorial authority, but also
because determinations of validity/ invalidity triggered bureaucrat-
ization of society as the colonial state created administrative and
enforcement institutions in response. The moral, economic, and
political costs of colonial governance hinged on timely institutional
evolution and reformulation of marriage law.
Whether the African form of marriage, which had come to bear
the tag "African customary marriage" to contrast it with "English
statutory marriage," was suitable to postcolonial society is a
question that drew extensive academic attention between 1950 and
1965, the years of decolonization. Was the customary organization
of family compatible with economic modernization and market
capitalism, which most independence governments were poised to
accept as national policy? Part III argues that former British colonies
retained customary marriage because it would have been impossible
to execute a capitalist national economic policy if the idea of the
customary family was dismantled. Its retention in states that placed
high premium on private property, individual free will, and formal
liberal constitutionalism is otherwise unintelligible. In line with the
reformist spirit of the moment, though retained, customary law
underwent doctrinal improvement in order to align the family with
the new economic outlook of the state.
Part IV argues that the postcolonial doctrinal development of
customary marriage law discussed in Part III has had the effect of
opening up Western-derived law to influence by customary law, and
vice versa. This has diminished the normative hierarchical
polarization of the two regimes discussed in Part II. Courts have
infused Western legal concepts with customary norms in order to
avoid unjust outcomes, and vice versa. Traditional theories of legal
pluralism never imagined regime fusion of this sort because they
assumed that customary law's inferior status would lead
sophisticated social actors to choose Western-derived law, a choice
that courts would honor. Courts have rightly been outcome
sensitive as they are aware that regime purity does not guarantee
just outcomes in many cases: peoples "affairs" in societies
undergoing intense transformation tend to be a patchwork of
relationships formed around competing legal regimes, often less
because of individual choice and more because of social complexity
and institutional constraints. Western/customary internal diffusion
of legal norms helps resolve the fundamental contradiction of
postcolonial economic modernization, namely, that formal rights
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have tended to strengthen the hands of oppressive regimes and to
skew wealth distribution. As much as the proliferation of formal
rights has been a global trend, such diffusion has become a counter
trend, which leads us to conclude that legal pluralism is
indispensable to national and transnational governance, and the
family and state are mutually constitutive.
This paper is critical of the tag "African" but uses it to
demonstrate its historical uses and capacity to adapt to a range of
state projects. It is used to perpetuate the African/Western
conceptual binary in the early colonial period, for instance, in
statutory, judicial, and academic references to African customary
law as a source of colonial law. In the postcolonial era, it is used in
statutes such as the African Christian Marriage and Divorce Act, a
Kenyan statute governing Christian marriages between African
individuals. In this sense it signals the subjects of a given statute
rather than customary or traditional practices. The tag has also had
rhetorical effect against Western domination and in favor of
nationalist programs. Despite these varied usages, we should not
assume that there exists a homogenous African people, customary
law, or identity.
Similarly, the category Anglo-American legal thought has
developed from long historical usage. I use it here to signal to the
reader that this work is limited in scope. It describes the evolution of
marriage law only in common law African countries, that is,
countries formerly under British colonial rule. While the influence
of English statutes, common law, and doctrines of equity, judicial
institutions and judicial practices is strong, so is that of Anglo-
American legal thought, a way of reasoning about law, adjudicating
disputes, and justifying legal outcomes by appealing simultaneously
to a body of positive laws and social ends.
I. Marriage and Conquest:
Classical Legal Thought in Colonial Family Law
The early colonial period began in the second half of the
nineteenth century and lasted until about 1930. Its primary focus
was the founding of the colonial state. Critical to this mission was
land expropriation for white settlement. By asserting exclusive
authority to define marriage, the colonial state disrupted African
social systems and their hold on land making expropriation for this
purpose possible. Courts relied on classical legal thought to cast
European and African conceptions of family as irreconcilable and to
postulate that moral individualism was the normative foundation of
355Summer 2012]
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
colonial law. They held that for this reason, marriages under African
customary law were invalid. English legal sense and morality varied
unpredictably; the decision to supplant African customary laws was
discretionary and case-by-case. While ostensibly legally bound,
colonial courts and administrative agents actually had almost free
reign to establish the content of African customary laws. They read
English law and morality as if static, deferred to and selected from
customary law in completely unpredictable ways.'
The significance of judicial use of techniques of classical legal
thought to comparative and international law is that it was an act of
reliance on the idea that the west and western institutions were
morally and legally superior to those of non-western society to
facilitate the diffusion of the conceptual templates, reasoning
techniques, and normative commitments of the former. To
proponents of this claim, no institution more starkly distinguished
the two societies than the family, and none more seriously
threatened the advance of market capitalism. In this sense then, the
family has been and remains at the center of global governance
concerns. Even though classical legal thought opposed state
regulation of the family in the West, categorizing it as a private
institution, it failed to do so in the colonies where instead, it
considered the Nonwestern family pre-modern and therefore not
within the protective cover of "the private."2
In the late colonial period, however, which lasted between 1930
and 1950, colonial governance policy, influenced by a shift in Anglo-
American legal thought toward a social view of law that recalibrated
the core assumptions of public international law and comparative
social science, shifted from opposition to acceptance of an obligation
to sustain customary institutions. Unlike classical legal thought, the
social view of law favored political and economic self-determination
of colonized peoples. It accepted the findings of ethnographers and
other social scientists that non-Western peoples had sophisticated
institutions of self-governance, which invalidated the premises of
colonial domination. It rejected the distinction between law and
custom and advocated for legal pluralism as part of a conception of
law in action.
In any case, the colonial government wanted to ease the costs of
governing vast swaths of remote territory directly without
1. Arthur Phillips, The Future of Customary Law in Africa, in SYMPOSIUM 88, 90 (Afrika
Instituut Leiden, 1956); Max Rheinstein, Law and Social Changes in Africa, 1962 WASH. U.
L. Q. 443, 447 (1962).
2. Maria Rosaria Marella, Critical Family Law, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
721 (2011) (drafted utilized and is on file with the author).
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relinquishing control by granting local communities total autonomy.
It created native courts whose judges it appointed and whose
jurisdiction it regulated. Customary law thus became positivized and
bureaucratized. Systemic incoherence, as evidenced by wildly
inconsistent judicial findings on the validity of customary marriages,
and social injustice, as evidenced by continuing impoverishment of
African populations, soon followed, eventually leading to the demise
of colonialism and ushering in an era of socio-legal reform and
doctrinal development customary family law, discussed in Part III.
A. Classical Legal Techniques in Early Colonial Courts
British governance of colonized territory typically began with
reception statutes that stipulated sources of law and their internal
hierarchy.3 They recognized African customary law but with a
proviso that voided it in favor of positive English law upon judicial
determination that it offended justice and morality or contravened
written law. This statutory mandate gave colonial courts broad
interpretive discretion, which they wielded in the early years to
produce a schematic colonial family law that bolstered colonial
domination. Courts carried out this commission with the tools of
classical legal thought, which required them to apply law to facts
with scientific exactitude. They did not merely decide cases, they
drew conclusions about the validity of customary law relationships
from a system of rules whose integrity and coherence it was their
duty to protect. Beyond finding that customary marriages were
invalid because they permitted polygamy and dowry and were
therefore repugnant to English justice and morality, the body of case
law they produced created a highly refined conceptual scheme that
enumerated the distinctive elements of African and European
marriages. They then extrapolated that present in the later and
missing in the former was the principle of moral individualism,
which it was their mandate to promote. They presented the
European marriage-type as formal, legalistic, demanding, exclusive,
and constraining, and therefore valid; and the African marriage-
type, as informal, customary, not strictly legal, nonbinding, and non-
exclusive, and therefore invalid.4
3. T. OLAWALE ELIAS, BRITISH COLONIAL LAW (1962).
4. "The 'lobola' marriage of the African is the typical form of matrimony of the
indigenous tribes of Africa south of the Sahara.... Known in modem South African law
as 'native customary union,' the lobola marriage does not, strictly speaking, qualify for
inclusion among South Africa's systems of matrimony. Being potentially polygamous, it
is not recognized as a legal marriage." H. R. Hahlo, The Matrimonial Rigimes of South
Africa, in FAMILY LAW IN ASIA AND AFRICA: 143,146 (J. N. D. Anderson ed., 1968); "In the
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A characteristic of early colonial family law pointing to the
influence of classical legal thought is the fact that its unit of analysis
was the individual, the holder of abstract rights derived exclusively
from a positive law administered and enforced by a learned state
bureaucracy.5 The formal definition of marriage under English law
had essential classical elements such as individualism, free will, and
exclusivity, a checklist by which colonial courts found African
customary law marriages not valid. Consider Hyde v. Hyde, the 1866
English case that defined marriage as the "voluntary union for life of
one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others," represents
the general tenor of the colonial attitude toward African customary
marriages.6
The elements of African customary law marriage that colonial
courts, applying the rule in Hyde, found repugnant to justice and
morality included polygamy and the giving of "bride price" by the
groom's family to the bride's family.7 Polygamy violated the
exclusivity requirement of English law and morality. The payment
of "bride price" not only violated English colonial morality -
colonialists understood it to be wife purchase - it caused marriage
to be about the community rather than about the individual
exclusively. Marriage under Hyde was a private agreement.
Marriage under African customary law was a public affair involving
the giving of material things by one family to the other. Community
colonial period it was widely contended that marriage did not exist in Africa at all.
Prejudices received indirect reflection in legislation: local marriage was defined as a
'customary union.' This presupposed a simple association." Irina Sinitsina, African Legal
Tradition: J. M. Sarbah, J. B. Danquah, N. A. Ollennu, 31 J. AFR. L. 44 (1987); See also Eugene
Cotran, The Changing Nature of African Marriage, in FAMILY LAW IN ASIA AND AFRICA 15,
16 (J. N. D. Anderson ed., 1968) (citing numerous examples of colonial denigration of
customary marriage).
5. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE
NEW LAW AND EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 25-27 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (discusses the will theory and individualism as
important characteristics of classical legal thought).
6. Cotran, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D. 130
(Eng.) definition of "marriage").
7. Out of the understanding that the transfer of wealth from the groom's family to
that of the bride's is an important element of an African customary law marriage that,
though involving property, does not constitute a commercial transaction but is rich with
cultural meaning. "Bride price" is a highly contested term used today in rhetorical
reference to usage prevalent in a bygone era of African/Western conceptual conflict.
Today the terms in use are bridewealth and dowry. See FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 108-111 (2005) (discussing Rex v.
Amkeyo, (1917) 7 E.A.L.R. 14 (Kenya) that is often used as an example of judicial hostilty
towards African customary marriage). EUGENE COTRAN, CASEBOOK ON KENYA
CUSTOMARY LAW 30-31 (1987).
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involvement was an affront to the private and individual nature of
marriage because it negated free will and the exercise of free choice
by individuals. Besides, the exchange of things in marriage was not
only pre-modern and primitive, it imputed a value to tangible goods
incomprehensible in market terms and could not be allowed to
prevail. Further, in place of tribal certification of marriage, the state
should have been the proper certification authority to protect
individuals from community control and domination as well as
facilitate observance of individual morality by keeping a public
marriage registry.
In denying legal validity to customary law marriages, colonial
courts followed "careful" deductive application of law, aiming to
make colonial laws coherent and predictable. Two cases exemplify
this practice. The first, Rex v. Amkeyo8 was a Kenyan case decided in
1917. It dealt with the question whether a woman married under
African customary law was a "wife" for the purpose of common law
spousal privilege in the law of evidence. The judge decided that,
because the African practice of "wife purchase" was repugnant to
justice and morality, it could not produce the privileged legal status
of "wife." The woman could therefore be compelled to testify
against her husband.
Spousal privilege under the law of evidence protected intimate
domestic communication between husband and wife from exposure
in the very public forum of criminal trial. Since English classical
legal thought consistently rejected the idea that Africans had the
concept of an intimate private domestic sphere, the privilege could
not be extended to parties married under African customary law.
Further, English legal positivists assumed that the African social
order could not comprehend adultery as a concept because it
embraced polygamy. In the same vein, whereas land acquisition
and family morality were private matters in the classical legal
scheme, African communities were considered not to have evolved a
"private" sphere that the state was obligated to honor and protect.
Holding land communally and marrying nonexclusively, English
legal positivists saw Africans as lacking the private individual
holder of exclusive and absolute rights.
In Bishan Singh,9 the second exemplary case, a 1923 Uganda case
in which two Christian Africans had purported to marry under
8. Rex v. Anikeyo, (1917) 7 E.A.L.R. 14 (Kenya); See BANDA, supra note 7; ELIAS,
supra note 3, at 111 (1962); Cf. E. Veitch, Some Examples of Judicial Law Making in African
Legal Systems, 34 MOD. L. REV. 42, 48 (1971)
9. H. F. Morris, Marriage Law in Uganda: Sixty Years of Attempted Reform, in FAMILY
LAW IN ASIA AND AFRICA 34, 39 (J. N. D. Anderson ed., 1968).
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customary law, the appeals court ruled that because they were
Christians, their "marriage" was invalid and therefore the husband
could not maintain an adultery proceeding against a Sikh who had
taken his "wife" away from him and was living with her. There
could be no adultery conviction if there had been no "marriage" in
the first place.
Singh was different from Amkeyo, one could argue, because the
complainant had "chosen" Christianity but practiced paganism. The
court had to determine which of the "conflicting" choices to honor.
In Amkeyo, the court faced no such conflicting choices; rather, it set
out to establish the legal basis for the validity of marriages under
colonial law. But both cases aimed to make the law predictable and
coherent. Amkeyo insisted that the definition of marriage and wife
needed consistent and systemic determination. In Singh, the positive
law schema which direct rule had established would have spun on
its head were people allowed to choose Christianity but practice
"pagan" marriage.10
Perhaps Africans marrying under customary law should not
have expected privileges due to those married under statutory law,
but one must note that in spite of efforts by classical jurists to
separate the spheres, a completely autonomous sphere of customary
law unaffected by statutory law had ceased to exist. It was therefore
not up to individual Africans to choose the right marriage system or
suffer the consequences. The "consequences" they would face after
Amkeyo and Singh endorsed non-recognition doctrine, which ran far
10. Justice Guthrie Smith observed:
The magistrate convicted the Sikh because the woman left her husband's house
and went to live with him. Such an application of the rigours of the Penal Code
to the protection of a mere casual and temporary liaison strikes one as startling
and contrary to British ideas of morality. . . . marriages valid from the British
point of view can only be effected under the Ordinance of 1902 except that
native Christians may if they please marry under the Ordinance of 1903. The
Ordinances are silent as to marriage of pagans; hence if two pagans marry by
native custom they will have all the rights which flow from such a marriage
under native law. The Ordinances are, however, imperative as to native
Christians and so a marriage between Christians celebrated according to native
custom is a nullity and no rights can be acquired thereby. Applying this to the
present cast the marriage between the complainant and the woman was invalid
and so no offence was committed by the Sikh in taking her away from him.
Another argument leading to the same conclusion is that when people cease to
be pagans and profess a religion which teaches monogamy and the sanctity of
marriage, they must be taken to have abandoned the right to contract non-
permanent unions such as are recognized and permitted under pagan customs.
Morris, supra note 9.
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beyond the customary sphere. The interpenetration of the positive
and the customary, of the informal and the formal, of the traditional
and the modern, of the economic and the moral, made it impossible
to be in one without being in the other. Before a statutory change in
South African law, for instance, a woman married customarily was
ineligible for workmen's compensation benefits upon the death of
her husband in the course of employment." Customary marriages
could not form the basis of formal employment claims. Non-
recognition promoted certainty in the formal employment market,
by shielding employers, bureaucrats, and courts from the task of
understanding the customary universe, but certainty in the formal
economy unsettled informal economies by interfering with the
allocation of resources within the family when a spouse had crossed
over into the formal economy.
At the beginning of colonialism, some regimes, South Africa for
example, held that marriage was for whites only.12 Later, South
Africa, like many other countries, shifted toward a policy of
"voluntary" assimilation and permitted those Africans who - by
virtue of education and religious conversion had become civilized
and attained new political status - to marry under the statutory law
that applied to Europeans.13 Statutory marriages had full legal effect
whoever the parties were and disputes went to regular courts for
determination. Thus Cole v. Cole, a Nigerian case decided in 1898,
held that a marriage under a colonial marriage ordinance stripped
an African of African identity and clothed him "with a status
unknown in African law." 14
The choice to assimilate gave Africans equal status with
Europeans in family law even if it did not give them substantive
political and economic equality in the whole.15 For an African to
exercise this choice and enjoy this limited equality at this time in
history, he or she had to have a certain level of affinity with and
access to the colonial establishment. Economic opportunity
accompanied assimilation.16  Thus, the making of the African
professional and business elite was from very early on bound up
11. Hahlo, supra note 4, at 147-48.
12. Neville Rubin, Customary Family Law in Southern Africa: Its Place and Scope, in
FAMILY LAW IN ASIA AND AFRICA 255, 258 (J. N. D. Anderson ed., 1968).
13. Id.
14. Cole v. Cole, [1898] 1 NLR 15 (Nigeria).
15. For an analysis of political and economic inequality of Africans vis It vis
Europeans during the colonial era, see Y.P. GHAI & J. P. W. B. MCAUSLAN, PUBLIC LAW
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN KENYA: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNMENT
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1970).
16. Id.
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with positive construction of the family.
Far from guaranteeing that the colonial state would respect pre-
existing rights, the listing of customary law as a source of colonial
law in reception statutes set in motion colonial expropriation of
African land. Following classical legal techniques of conceptual
differentiation and guided by moral individualism, colonial law was
keen to separate land from family, morality from economy, and
individual from group. Courts did this by casting customary
marriages as questions of morality, and declared them invalid on
that score. Conversely, casting land as a question of economy, they
recognized customary land tenure as valid, characterized it as
communal as opposed to private, then decided that it was legally
inferior to European title under the doctrine of acquisition of land by
conquest and under utilitarian theory of market efficiency, and
therefore abrogable. To recognize African land tenure but label it
communal was to give colonialists carte blanche to acquire African
land. They argued, very simply, that communal land tenure was
inferior, inefficient, and incapable of conferring property rights and
could therefore not prevent colonial expropriation.17 Only a system
on an equal jurisprudential footing with the conqueror's could
provide that protection; and the African system lacked the necessary
stature. This technique of inclusive subordination was a staple of
classical legal thought.18 The colonialists didn't steal African land;
rather, they respected African land tenure systems by recognizing
them. By the mere application of rational logic, they then
determined that expropriating African land did not offend law.19 In
this way, colonial lawmakers separated customary law from its
social context by denying an important aspect of it: that family was
an important locus of African normativity from which marriage and
land tenure derived their validity. To hold that there could be a
customary law under reception statutes but that customary
marriages were repugnant to justice and morality while land tenure
was not reified both customary law and Western justice and
morality.
17. H. W. 0. OKOTH-OGENDO, TENANTS OF THE CROWN: THE EVOLUTION OF
AGRARIAN LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN KENYA (1991); James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism,
Colonialism, and International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1013 (2007).
18. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205
(1979).
19. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (2005). For a discussion of similar uses of positive law to override
customary tenure, see E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK
ACT (Pantheon Books 1975); WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS,
COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (Hill & Wang 1983).
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9362
BEYOND BED AND BREAD
The different treatment land and marriage received exemplified
classical legal thought's tendency to split and reify social spheres. 20
The pairing of land with economy and of family with morality in the
early colonial context was consistent with the prevailing orthodoxy
of Anglo-American classical legal thought, in particular the tendency
to treat the private and public as separate and unrelated spheres.21 It
could tolerate hierarchy, altruism, and community in the Western
family, considered private, but not in the African family, seen as pre-
modern and a threat to the ideals the clear demarcation of private
and public represented. Except for this splitting techniques, the
unity of family and land as simultaneously moral and economic was
not alien to Western legal thought. 22 However, accepting this would
have undermined the conceptual foundations of colonialism by
blurring the line between Western and African understandings of
family.
Although aimed at ensuring order and market certainty, the
subordination of African customary law to English law and morality
produced vast uncertainty and conflict. To produce cognizable
rights, customary land tenure needed to have created private
individual property rights, and to yield cognizable marriages,
African relationships needed to be individualistic and exclusive.
The colonial state became constitutive of both land and family: land
existed to advance a market society and family to universalize moral
individualism. Unstated in this arrangement is that recognition of
land tenure paved the way for land expropriation and non-
recognition of African marriages weakened the African social order,
and the two forces, of land tenure recognition and marriage non-
recognition, worked in tandem to enhance colonial domination.
Since individualistic morality was a precondition for economic
opportunity, defining marriage was an important act of conquest
and a cornerstone of the colonial market-oriented state.
20. Kennedy, supra note 18 (discusses reification as a classical legal technique).
21. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 35; AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III,
Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993).
22. A. N. Allott, Family Property in West Africa: Its Juristic Basis, Control and
Enjoyment, in FAMILY LAW IN ASIA AND AFRICA 121 (J. N. D. Anderson ed., 1968);
Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, Do African Systems of Land Tenure Require a Special Terminology?,
9 J. AFR. L. 114 (1965); See also Marella, supra note 2.
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B. Glimpses of the Social View of Law in the Late Colonial
Period: Legal Dualism and the Problem of Marriage
Conversion
The end of the early colonial period happened when the colonial
government began to rely on native institutions to govern vast
swaths of remote territory including the reserves created for
occupation by Africans it had displaced to settle Europeans. The
doctrine of legal dualism, forged by Lord Lugard, a colonial
governor in Nigeria, and broadly accepted by governors across the
continent, held that native institutions were efficient tools of colonial
governance.23  Under it, chiefs had considerable administrative
authority over African-settled areas, and courts began the process of
positivization and bureaucratization of customary law. Disputes
involving non-Africans were handled by regular colonial courts
applying English law, and unlike native courts, were considered
modern and prestigious. 24
At this time, proponents of the social view of law were
effectively undermining classical legal thought. They denied the
illegitimacy of group rights and social welfare and saw legal
23. To get an idea of the shift in attitude that characterized this period, see Morris,
supra note 9, at 38:
[Diuring the decade immediately following the enactment of these
Ordinances there was little criticism of the law as it stood. Those were days
when administrators, as well as missionaries, believed that the inherent
virtues of Christianity and Western civilization would soon lead to the
replacement of indigenous customs such as polygamy. The outlook of the
administrator of the inter-war period, however, tended to be very different.
Unlike his pre-war counterpart, he was not likely to be a regular churchgoer,
and frequently had little sympathy with either the missionaries or their
activities... . The pre-British, or rather pre-missionary, period tended to be
idealized by many of these officers who ... often built up for themselves a
somewhat synthetic and romanticized version of what the way of life in the
old society had been. Institutions such as bridewealth, and the mystical
symbolism believed to be associated with it, appeared to many European
administrators to be more attractive than the often rather forbidding and
puritanical tenets of the missionaries, who were at times accused of having
undermined customary virtues and brought about the destruction of
established values rather than the substitution of higher ones.
Id.
24. For a comprehensive review of the creation and operation of African
administration, see GHAl & MCAUSLAN, supra note 15. For the argument that African
authorities, as constituted by colonial regimes, harmed African communities, see
MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY
OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996).
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pluralism as a more accurate conception of law. They challenged the
very core of colonialism by promoting the doctrine of political and
economic self-determination of peoples in public international law,
and by engineering a power shift away from sovereign states to
international institutions such as the United Nations.25 Lugard's
legal dualism as practiced in the late colonial period however failed
to accomplish the aims of this view. There was no reversal of land
expropriation nor a serious attempt to revitalize customary law
institutions ravaged by colonial legal machinations. Instead, there
was grafting of formal institutions supposedly administering
customary law onto a broken social system. The problems that
ensued only convinced the colonial government of the superiority of
English moral and economic individualism. The real purpose of
legal dualism became to promote the eradication of customary
marriages by providing avenues and incentives for their conversion
to Western-type marriages.26 A similar sensibility informed late
colonial land law policy.27
A conversion marriage was at par with a Christian marriage
meaning it was monogamous. English not customary law governed
it.28 It was unlawful to attempt a conversion of a Christian marriage
25. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 21, 47.
26. Cotran, supra note 4, at 23.
27. M. P. K. SORRENSON, LAND REFORM IN KIKUYU COUNTRY: A STUDY IN
GOVERNMENT POLICY (1967); M. P. K. SORRENSON, ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN
KENYA (1968).
28. In Cole, a couple had married under a Christian marriage ordinance. Upon the death
of the husband, his brother claimed that he was entitled to inherit his brother's property and
to be trustee of his brother's lunatic [sic] son over the protestations of the widow. Ordering
that the English law of succession govern, Judge Brandford Griffith noted:
It is a consequence of the loose tie of the native marriage that by strict
native law a man's eldest brother on his mother's side inherits. The brother
is part of the man's family. The wife and her children are part of the wife's
family. . . . In fact a Christian marriage clothes the parties to such a
marriage and their offspring with a status unknown to native law. . . . To
subject a man who marries under Christian law to native law and custom is
inconsistent with principles of justice, equity and good conscience "Were
such a contention to hold good, then an educated native Lagos gentle-
man - maybe a doctor, or a barrister, or a clergyman, or a bishop (for there
are all such) - marrying an educated native lady out of the Colony and
coming to reside permanently in Lagos would have his estate subject to
native law in case he died intestate, his widow being required by a strict
undiluted native law to act as wife to her brother-in-law in order to obtain
support.... I am of the opinion that this is a case in which the court ought
not to observe the native law of inheritance.
Cole v. Cole, [1898] 1 NLR 15 (Nigeria).
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to a customary marriage. 29 Conversion stopped the application of
customary law to the converter's family matters. It provided an
escape from customary law obligations without necessarily
suspending customary law entitlements. It therefore had economic
distributive consequences that created winners and losers. The act
of inclusive subordination did not eliminate the customary sphere
but it defined its relationship with regard to the state and market.
Formal law legislated the possibility of customary property rights or
customary monogamy out of the customary sphere, presenting this
as features of the formal regime even more starkly. The only
difference in this era is that Africans could exercise the "choice" to
cross over and were not punished with invalidity for not doing so.
The colonial government expressed its opposition to customary
marriages in a variety of ways. The least accommodating regime, for
example South Africa, recognized customary marriages but did not
consider them legal marriages. 30 The most accommodating regime
statutorily modified certain aspects of customary marriage, for
instance to require registration, then attached the full benefits of
marriage.31
The more people crossed over to the Western-type marriage, the
more the two spheres intersected, with important distributive effects
that seemed contrary to the very idea of market certainty that the
colonial government wanted to promote. Far from producing
certainty and predictability, colonial family law generated
incoherence and injustice. Proponents of reform would later argue
that courts during this era had produced vastly disconnected legal
decisions that did nothing to develop customary law into a rational
doctrinal legal system. 32
29. BANDA, supra note 7, at vv.
30. Consider:
The fact remains that it is the traditional 'marriage' of the Bantu; that even
today millions of Bantu couples in South Africa are joined in this form of
matrimonial relationship; and that South African law, though it does not
accept the union as a legal marriage, grants recognition to it in important
respects. Section (11) (1) of the Native Administration Act, after providing
that native law is not to be applied where it is opposed to the principles of
public policy or natural justice, expressly states that 'it shall not be lawful
for any court to declare that the custom of lobola or bogadi or other similar
custom is repugnant to public policy or natural justice.
Hahlo, supra note 4.
31. Cotran, supra note 4, at 26.
32. Lloyd Fallers, Customary Law in the New Afican States, in AFRICAN LAW: NEW
LAW FOR NEW NATIONS 71 (Hans Wolfgang Baade ed., 1963); Rheinstein, supra note 1.
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The effect of conversion was to create a "monogamous legal
marriage" and to dissolve all preexisting customary law marriages
and to render them adulterous liaisons.33 Upon conversion to
Christianity, hitherto polygamous husbands were required to choose
one customary law wife with whom to contract a Christian marriage
and to abandon the rest.34 This was a shocking and traumatic
outcome for women not chosen. Extensive pauperization of this
sought was hardly flattering to the socially inclined colonial legal
dualism.
In addition, even a wholly monogamous conversion, for
instance where never before married individuals first observed
customary law before solemnizing a statutory union, the dual
character of such a marriage brought African courts and regular
courts into jurisdictional conflict. Would African courts have
jurisdiction over the customary portion of the marriage, specifically
the return of bride price as a crucial signifier of an effective
customary law divorce or would a statutory divorce suffice?35 The
parties might have argued that they did not fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of courts charged with enforcing the Christian form of
marriage and seek divorce under customary law if its procedures
were less restrictive or accessible or if such a move was important in
their community. 36 The specter of returning dowry might have
dissuaded the man from customary adjudication, leaving customary
expectations unmet. Alternatively, the specter of complying with
the English Married Women's Property Act, received in most
colonial jurisdictions, would have encouraged resort to customary
adjucation.
The rule that Africans entering into Christian marriages had
been stripped of their African identity and were therefore not
governed by customary law was disingenuous, was never given its
full effect, and was another instance where systemic incoherence
produced distributional unfairness. In formal logic, converting
Africans should not have been allowed customary law inheritance
once they had opted out of that system. This was not the case
however. They remained fully entitled to their share of family
property under customary law even after conversion marriages.
This equivocation was a practical necessity, given the nature of the
African family as a unit of economic production.37 At the same time,
33. Hahlo, supra note 4, at 147.
34. Morris, supra note 9.
35. FAMILY LAW IN ASIA AND AFRICA: 143 (J. N. D. Anderson ed., 1968).
36. Id.
37. Infra, part III.
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converts could use their choice of Christian marriage law to prevent
members of their extended family from asserting rights of succession
recognized by customary law, on the assumption that wealth
acquired during the Christian marriage was exclusively held.38
Those seeking to streamline family law grappled with the question
whether to decouple the law of marriage from that of succession to
avoid such outcomes.39
Changes in the statutory marriage regime sometimes had
unforeseeable effects on customary marriage regimes, and vice
versa. For example, when the prohibition of adultery in the
Ugandan colonial Penal Code was repealed but customary law
forbidding adultery remained enforceable, African husbands who
had contracted Christian marriages were in a very precarious
situation. While customary law husbands could use customary law
provisions to have Christian husbands jailed for committing
adultery with their wives, Christian husbands did not have the same
advantage. Here we must note that colonial conferral of penal
authority on African courts and institutions led to a criminalization
of what in the precolonial era were merely civil claims. 40 When these
Christian husbands were thrown in jail for adultery, they did not
have recourse in the event that their wives strayed in their absence.41
This problem could not be corrected through a repeal of criminal
customary law. Construing territorial law in the Penal Code to
override customary law was legally sensible but politically
untenable. To maintain a balance of governing power in the context
of legal dualism, sensible concessions to African authority had to be
made even if they produced profoundly contradictory outcomes.
38. THE FUTURE OF LAW IN AFRICA: RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE LONDON
CONFERENCE, 28 DECEMBER 1959-8 JANUARY 1960 (A. N. Allot ed., Butterworth 1960).
39. Gordon R. Woodman, Ghana Reforms the Law of Intestate Succession, 29 J. AFR. L.
118 (1985).
40. Phillips, supra note 1, at 91:
native courts in the British territories are usually empowered to try
"offenses against native law and custom." One of the most frequent
instances is adultery: African customary law would formerly have
regarded this (as odes modem English law) as normally giving rise to
nothing more than a civil claim for compensation, but African opinion at
the present day demands its repression by means of criminal proceedings -
i.e. by the modem penal sanctions of fine and imprisonment. The
recognition of a native law of crimes may thus involve a certain element of
fiction, in so far as it invokes the authority of indigenous custom.
Id.
41. Morris, supra note 9.
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The problems of incoherence and injustice described provided
the impetus for dismantling legal dualism as a doctrine of
governance, and was the raison d'8tre for the anti-colonial
nationalist rebellion. Family law was constitutive of the postcolonial
state not only in this way, but also by being a critical link to
postcolonial orientation to market-based economic development.
II. Marriage and Economy: The Social View of Law and
the Doctrinal Development of Postcolonial Family Law
The demise of colonialism at mid-twentieth century ushered in
an era of great excitement about the transplantation of new laws to the
new nations of Africa or the adoption of laws received during the
colonial period to their nascent visions of prosperity. With this
excitement came deep concern that customary law, which governed
land and family relationships, was unsuitable to the demands of the
moment and incompatible with these economic modernization laws.
Statecraft was the art of designing whole legal systems for the
purpose of promoting the rule of law defined as liberal
constitutionalism and respect for private property rights and
contractual freedom. As defined by adherents of the classical
tradition in the early colonial period and proponents of legal dualism
in the late colonial era, customary law threatened the success of new
nations. The land ownership and marriage practices it endorsed were
inconsistent with the rule of law paradigm broadly broached as a
universal model for statehood by international law jurists.
Two ways of thinking about the future of customary law in
postcolonial Africa emerged. Rejecting calls for the abolition of
customary law made by scholars such as Professor Rene David,
scholars such as Professors Eugene Cotran and Anthony Allott,
whose work I will analyze here, took the view that a grassroots
understanding of customary law was lacking in international
academic and bureaucratic circles. Following in the footsteps of
ethnographers, anthropologists, and economists, but rejecting their
pronouncements on customary law as non-authoritative for judicial
purposes, they set out to establish the real content and character of
customary law. They sent interview panels around the continent to
gather information from the people about their law and to record
this law into what they called the "Restatements of Customary
Law," tribe-by-tribe accounts later formed the basis for internal
doctrinal systematization of customary law and its ultimate
harmonization with national and international laws. I will label the
intellectual work done to justify and develop the project of
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restatement as "Doctrinal Staging I" and that of the production of
doctrinal coherence for purposes of national and international
integration as "Doctrinal Staging II." In the former, scholars made
elaborate arguments about the relevance of customary law to the
modern African state, particularly its compatibility with the
economic development agenda. The crux of their argument was that
economic individualism was characteristic of customary law as
practiced by the people. Representations to the contrary were, being
of positive customary law developed by colonial functionaries that
were out of touch with the people, mistaken. In the latter, disparate
tribal customs recorded in the Restatements were synthesized into
singular national customary family laws. This was achieved by
setting apart rules common to all groups as general rules to be
applied by courts in all cases. Rules unique to a particular group
were not part of the general scheme and would be vulnerable to
broad judicial discretion and possible exclusion through legislation.
While the work of aggregating and categorizing customary rules
was undertaken by scholars usually on government commission,
that of progressive reformation of the artifact they provided lay
squarely in the courts. The judge was the celebrated trustee of the
Anglo-American social view of law in Africa.
The power of this view of law lay in shifting focus from sterile
African/Western conceptualism to an instrumental focus on law as a
tool for social adaptation and development.42  In restating and
codifying customary law, reformers captured what colonial law had
obliterated, the "economic man" as an important figure of mid-
twentieth century Africa who straddled many legally constructed
worlds and used myriad systems of law in the process. From then on,
customary law, and the family, acquired national and international
significance. States, international institutions and transnational
investors had to understand its political and economic import to
advance their interests. Academics and civil society groups often
found themselves at loggerheads. Comparativists needed to convince
internationalists that robust legal pluralism did not hinder human
rights and the rule of law and that it was not another conceptual
gimmick to prevent the alignment of the family, group, or community
with individual rights and market freedom.43 By arguing that
42. Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of
Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. I. L. Rev. 597 (1994); Kennedy, supra note 5 (discussing acceptance
of legal pluralism especially in Anglo-American business dispute resolution); Femanda G.
Nicola, Family Law Exceptionalism in Comparative Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 777 (2010).
43. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and
International Governance, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 545 (1997).
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customary law was economic law, reformers demonstrated that it was
not just a "family law," it did not derive its legitimacy from
fossilization as "tradition" but from renewal and adaptation in
modernity. As such, it could become compatible with the new rule of
law paradigm through systematic reform to bolster its economic
advantages and negate that which was merely cultural, such as dowry
and polygamy, that had no other function than totemic or status
significance. So no, legal pluralism would not be a threat to the global
march of market capitalism, but in it all, it would leave the individual
rooted in her social context. In Part IV, I will discuss the impact of this
diffusion of legal thought, conceptual templates, and reasoning
techniques on the production of national family law regimes.
A. Economic Individualism as African Social Reality
When law ceases to reflect social reality, the people it expects to
govern circumvent it. This, mid-twentieth century socio-legal
reformers argued, was the fate of colonial family law. The
customary law applied and enforced by colonial courts was a
creature of archaic presuppositions about the African worldview,
and it fitted poorly with other laws. At a time of fervent economic
transformation and opportunity, it stifled individual choice in the
name of Africanness. For example, many converted customary
marriages in order to acquire marriage certificates, typically given
for statutory but not for customary marriages, but newly required by
lending institutions and landlords, and in some cases to access
government services.44 Converters however remained faithful to the
customary legal system in every other way. Another example - the
emergent postcolonial elite combined customary and statutory law
in unprecedented ways in order to gobble up resources liquidated
by departing settlers.45
At two conferences held in Amsterdam in 195546 and in London
in 1959,47 and in various writings thereafter,48 an emergent
44. Janet Kabeberi-Macharia & Celestine Nyamu, Marriage by Affidavit: Developing
Alternative Laws on Cohabitation in Kenya, in THE CHANGING FAMILY: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FAMILY AND FAMILY LAW (J. Eekelaar & Robert T. Nhlapo eds., 1998).
45. OKOTH-OGENDO, supra note 17.
46. THE FUTURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN AFRICA (Afrika Instituut Leiden 1956).
47. THE FUTURE OF LAW IN AFRICA, supra note 38.
48. T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW (1956); Fallers,
supra note 32. Richard L. Abel, Customary Laws of Wrongs in Kenya: An Essay in Research
Method, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 573 (1969); Francis Mading Deng, The Future of Customary Law
in the Sudan, 11 MALAYA L. REV. 268 (1969); F. A. Ajayi, The Future of Customary Law in
Nigeria, in THE FUTURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN AFRICA 42-49 (Afrika Instituut Leiden
1956); The Future of Law in Africa, supra note 38.
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community of internationally renowned scholars pondered the
future of customary law in postcolonial Africa. They concluded that
in the hopes of keeping customary law pure and organic, colonialists
had left it in the hands of traditionalists rather than modern
Africans; the "traditional man" rather than the "best man,"49 and
had institutionalized community control of the individual.50 The
customary law enforced by colonial institutions was a caricature of
the real customary law practiced by the people. Skewed in favor of
the colonial status quo, the people had every reason to circumvent it,
and they did.51
Africans were acting contrary to the expectations of the state by
pursuing economic opportunities on an individual basis and
modifying customary law to suit individual preference. F. A. Ajayi,
a Nigerian jurist, invoking Maine's evolutionary institutionalism
explained:
In the sphere of Private Law, there is ample evidence in Nigeria
today, whatever exceptions may be found to it elsewhere, of
Maine's famous generalization that "the movement of progressive
societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract".
As DIEDERICH WESTERMANN has observed "The outstanding
phenomenon in social development (i.e. in Africa) today is the
emergence of the individual from the group". This movement,
this emergence, has made a tremendous impact on various phases
of customary Private Law and has led to radical modification of
many of its old concepts whether as relating to Land Tenure, or to
Domestic Relations, Succession etc. 52
P. J. Idenburg agreed with Ajayi that Africa, unable to weather
Western economic and religious penetration, and liberal ideology,
was moving towards individualism:
In many regions of Africa we may witness the development of a
tendency towards the autonomy of the individual's personality.
We have here an extremely remarkable phenomenon, which will
not fail to make its influence felt on every aspect of life, and also,
therefore, on a great many sections of customary law. This
development is being stimulated by the principle of liberalism,
which carries, in the contacts between Europeans and Africans, a
power that may be compared to that behind the industrial
49. Ajayi, supra note 48, at 52.
50. Id.
51. MAMDANI, supra note 24; L. Amede Obiora, Reconsidering African Customary Law,
17 LEGAL STUD. F. 217 (1993-1994).
52. Ajayi, supra note 48, at 59.
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revolution in the first half of the 19th century in Europe. Neither
should we forget the influence of the church missions in favour of
this development. 53
Noting Africa's turn to individualism, reformers argued that
Africans were "naturally" responding to pressures and pleasures of
their interaction with the West.M They observed that individuals
were taking advantage of new laws that promoted individual land
ownership and corrected the inefficiencies of traditional land tenure.
New individual rights granted by the state had greater market value
than traditional rights originating from the family.
The emergence of single as distinct from the customary composite
families and the ready answer which the free disposition of land
provides to many a modern economic need have led to a
modification of the former concepts of absolute inalienability of
land and of its holding in group ownership. Disposal of land now
takes place in many large towns whether in the form of leases,
mortgages or out-and-out sales. The concept of individual
ownership has made its appearance in urban and rural areas alike,
and though the customary ideas of family and communal
ownership still hold most of the field, one can foresee that it is
only a matter of time, though perhaps a long time yet, when they
will become the exceptions rather than the general rule. 55
Ajayi also pointed to the decline of group control over individual
family matters as another indication of Africa's turn to
individualism. This decline manifested itself through new
customary rules or through rejection of old ones. Rules on how and
with whom to commence a customary marriage were being ignored
or modified without penalty. Rules on dissolution and custody were
also not strictly followed. For example, in place of residency and
membership rules, the best interests of the child rule was widely
accepted.56 Each one of these examples pointed to one thing -
53. P. J. Idenburg, Preface, THE FUTURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN AFRICA, at ix (Afrika
Instituut Leiden 1956).
54. Rheinstein, supra note 1, at 451.
55. Ajayi, supra note 48, at 60.
56. Ajayi, supra note 48, at 62. Yet, on domestic relations reform, Ajayi advised caution:
Here indeed is a sphere of Customary Law where for the future changes
would probably have to be left as much as possible to the rising standard of
general enlightenment, and official regulation be resorted to only where
effective enforcement will be possible and the interests of social welfare
clearly demands it.
Ajayi, supra note 48, at 62.
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customary law's acceptance of individual freedom, choice, and
consent, all without formal state intervention.
B. Doctrinal Staging I: Eugene Cotran's Formal and Antony
Allott's Substantive Template for Modern African Family Law
Rejecting the customary law developed by colonial institutions,
socio-legal reformers went to the people to ascertain and record the
content of real customary law as they practiced it. This project of
ascertainment and recordation is known as the Restatement Project
and the books it produced are generally referred to as the
"Restatements." Several nuggets of Anglo-American legal thought
influenced this moment. One is of course the idea that law ought to
reflect social reality, popularized by legal realists such as Dean
Roscoe Pound. Reformers objected that the aim of colonial
institutions had been to preserve not to develop customary law.5 7
Colonial judges had not exerted themselves professionally and
intellectually to establish the content of customary law and this
disconnected their work from the lived reality of disputants and
their communities. They sometimes even applied English law in the
name of applying customary law.58 The second idea, popularized by
another legal realist, Karl Llewellyn, is that recording informal law
would make it ascertainable by courts, and would put it in a form
amenable to reform by courts, and that judicial reform was as
legitimate as reform by legislatures. Legal representation would
assume a Holmesian dimension, namely, lawyers making prophesies
about what the courts would do in specific circumstances rather than
speculating on what nonlawyers in villages would say the law was. 59
Down the road, the two ideas would encounter a third, advanced by
the early proponents of the law and development movement, that
postcolonial economic development required the rule of law.60 In
time, particularly during the neoliberal era, international financial
institutions pegged a nation's economic advancement prospects on
its progress along this path of reform.61
These Anglo-American influences had a special resonance
57. Cotran, supra note 4, at 26.
58. Cotran, supra note 4.
59. Gordon R. Woodman, Some Realism About Customary Law - The West African
Experience, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 128 (1969). Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10
Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
60. David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
61. Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling and
Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 513 (2005).
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because the postcolonial moment brought conflicts between
tradition and modernity to the fore. Socio-legal reformers rejected
assertions of tradition reminiscent of the colonial era and went out to
provide a framework that would preserve customary law not as
tradition but as living law administrable by modern courts.
[T]here is little evidence of a rooted conservatism resistant to the
forces of change. But adaptation requires more than a willingness
to change; it also requires techniques for maintaining a satisfactory
degree of consistency and unity in the law as the various courts
applying it encounter and respond to new problems. In the
Anglo-American legal tradition, such consistency is maintained
through systems of reporting by means of which courts are made
aware of precedent-setting decisions. . .. African customary law is
an excellent example of what Max Weber called "substantive legal
irrationality." Decisions are reached by judges on the basis of an
implicit body of normative rules which may be highly consistent
internally, but these rules are seldom made explicit and formally
manipulated in the decisions that are rendered.62
Professors Eugene Cotran and Antony Allott of the School of
African and Oriental Studies, London, were the pioneers of the
Restatement Project. In my view, they made at least two concrete
contributions to comparative legal thought. In a manner reminiscent
of Anglo-American legal realism, they provided postcolonial courts
with a doctrinal template from which to decide customary law cases,
the subject of this section, and a flexible scheme of customary law
rules amenable to judicial reform, which I discuss in the next section.
To make the case for the ascertainment of African customary
law, Professor Cotran, surprisingly, invoked Hyde v. Hyde63 This is
the 1866 English case we encountered in Part II that defined
marriage as the "voluntary union for life of one man and one woman
to the exclusion of all others." On its authority, early colonial courts
had declared customary law marriages invalid. In his view,
nowhere could you find the difference between English and African
views of marriage more starkly stated:
[A]lmost every single word of this Christian definition of marriage
is inapplicable to marriages contracted under the traditional
African customary law. It is argued, first, that in many African
societies marriage was not a voluntary union, especially as far as
brides were concerned; secondly, that the union was not for life
since it might be easily dissolved without the intervention of a
62. Fallers, supra note 32.
63. Contran, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing Hyde v. Hyde, [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D. 130).
Sununer 2012] 375
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
court; thirdly, that the marriage was not so much a union between
a man and a woman, as an alliance between two family groups;
and finally, that far from being a union to the exclusion of all
others, all customary marriages were potentially polygamous.64
Cotran added the following four to the above list of distinguishing:
long and complex formalities and ceremonies which made it difficult
to know at what point a marriage took effect; dowry payments to the
bride's family by the groom's family; "emphasis on procreation as
the prime end of marriage"; and the social and legal inferiority of the
wife.65
The typology Cotran developed manifests a familiar tension in
classical liberal legal thought - that between individualism and
communalism but which is presented as a natural distinction
between African and Western worldviews. In the violent, coercive,
and hierarchical ordering of the African/Western encounter,
individualism is attributed to the West and communalism to
African. 66  In fact, Anglo-American jurists have shown that
individualism and communalism are two sides of the same coin,
inseparable and present in Western society as much as anywhere.67
Cotran's typology therefore more than simply describes the two
societies. As the third column of the chart below shows, the seven
factors of the African/Western marriage typology correspond to
important conceptual building blocks of the postcolonial African
legal order.68 The critical role family law plays in aligning Africa
with the high aspirations of twentieth century progressive liberalism
is evident.69
64. Cotran, supra note 4, at 15.
65. Cotran, supra note 4, at 17-20.
66. PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 175 (2001).
67. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1975-1976) (argues that the same tension between community and individual
free will inheres in Anglo-American legal thought).
68. Philomila Tsoukala, Marrying Family Law to the Nation, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 873
(2010) (discusses the role of Greek family law in the constitution of the European
statehood).
69. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC Socio-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A
SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW (1999).
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Cotran noted that, during colonial rule, customary "marriage"
was considered so unlike English marriage that it could not be given
remotely similar legal recognition. This construction was an error:
he rejected Hyde and its progeny. He did not agree with the
characterization of African customary relationships as wife
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purchase, concubinage, customary unions, and casual liaisons.70
Neither did he agree with the repugnancy doctrine as applied by
colonial courts. Endorsing socio-legal pluralism and therefore
rejecting classical legal positivism (that only the state could define
marriage), he held the view that multiplicity and diversity of tribal
systems made concrete definitions of marriage impossible. It was
not necessary to engage in the search for a definition of marriage and
it was meaningless to make concrete definitions the basis for law.
Instead, from the actual practice of African communities, one could
distill rules that cut across almost all tribes. These general rules
would provide points of uniformity and continuity which taken
together would aggregate into a national customary family law.7 1
Ascertainable by courts, these general rules would promote legal
and economic certainty to citizens, and would protect them from
exploitation as spouses, children, or property owners. Further, a law
defined by the people and reflecting their practices stood a better
chance of success than imposed law. More importantly, such a law
affirmed economic individualism as a desirable basis for law in
Africa.72 A discerning reader will notice that in making this
argument, Cotran was rejecting something that Professor Felix
Cohen, a preeminent legal realist, had earlier critiqued - the
obsession classical jurists had with terminological exactitude and
binary schemes of thought that supposedly allowed law to be
applied to facts with scientific exactitude.73
Even though Cotran objected to classical positivist invalidation
of customary marriages, he did not question its characterizations of
the African, or even of the Western family, as directly and clearly as
did Professor Antony Allott, his counterpart in the Restatement
Project. Allott argued that African and Western views of family
were very similar if one looked at the social function of the
institution of family rather than at its formal attributes, and
ultimately rejected the individualism/communalism binary as a
nineteenth century legal fiction.
The judges in England, aided by the legislator, are trying to
rebuild a legally-structured integrated family system after the
ravages of individualism have done their worst. A new family
70. Cotran, supra note 4; Morris, supra note 9.
71. Cotran, supra note 4.
72. Woodman, supra note 59. See also Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence -
The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
73. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
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property system, according shares or claims to wife and children
over the property of the main wage-earner, may well result -
something like this is already roughly achieved through the
various presumptions of law and the contributions of employed
married women to the household resources. It would be a tragedy
if, as so often seems to be the case, the laws in England and in
West Africa move in opposite directions, the West African law
towards nineteenth-century English individualism whilst the
English law moves towards the 'African' concept of the integrated
family or household production or property controlling unit.74
To Allott, the African family could become comprehensible to the
English lawyer just by looking at the similarities between its social
functions and those of basic English institutions such as the limited
liability company, trusts, joint tenancies and even clubs. Allott
noted that the organization scheme of the African family into
sublineages and households making up lineages, each with a head
bearing concrete legal obligations, while producing an institution
unknown to English law, namely, the family property system,
played functions similar to those performed by English legal
institutions.75 The African family property system was more than a
sphere of intimacy. It was a zone of capital production and
investment, providing economic security across generations. As
such, the very elements that Cotran's typology highlighted as
distinctive to the African marriage form were comprehensible to an
English lawyer looking at the African family through the lens of
English corporate or property law. These branches of English law
were attuned to balancing individual free will and community
interests than classical English family law of Hyde's time, which was
steeped in absolute individualism.76 Allott's then was a theory of
family that adopted Hohfeldian analytical rights framework,
celebrated in Anglo-American legal thought as an important basis
for realist and pragmatic legal thought.7
To carry out its economic functions, the family, like the
corporation, needed to balance between individual freedom and
community interests. Allott argued that the family property system
he described laid out significant protections of the individual. The
74. Allott, supra note 22, at 141.
75. Id. at 121.
76. For comparable analysis of the Chinese conceptions of family, see Teemu
Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory
in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000).
77. Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wisc. L. REV. 975 (1982); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
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authority of the head of household could be challenged in many
ways and certainly through a process similar to accounting
proceedings under English common ownership law. Disagreements
among sublineages or between a head of household and immediate
family members over ownership could be resolved through
partition, also an English common law remedy. Incompetent heads
of household had been replaced even by putting a female in
charge.78  Moreover, flexibility and dynamism were essential
characteristics of customary law such that avenues for individuals to
escape community control abound; for instance, self-acquired
property was the property of the individual by whose efforts the
property was acquired, even if such property had intermingled with
family property.79 Besides individuals used modern devices such as
wills, marriage registration, and land registration to signal to family
members that they desired to conduct certain aspects of their
intimate or commercial life outside the group's consultative and
adjudicative avenues.80
Taken together, Cotran's and Allott's depictions of the family,
the one formal and the other social, armed postcolonial courts to
take the reins of postcolonial legal development because they were
dynamic templates of formal rules and substantive principles of
customary law. If courts followed this template, judicial decisions
would be both doctrinally sound and socially dynamic. As I hope to
show below, postcolonial courts adopted this dual structure to
resolve family law disputes triggered by economic development
programs and modernization. For example, they followed Cotran's
checklist of elements to determine the legal threshold for marriage
validity, and Allott's enumeration of the social function of family
law as an interpretative framework for resolving disputes between
family members and unscrupulous heads of household bent on
robbing widows of marital property. By providing complementary
templates for judicial development of doctrines of customary family
law, they advanced a way of thinking about the adjudicative
function that was at core reminiscent of mid-twentieth century
Anglo-American social view of law.81 Further, beyond equipping
courts with a socially pliable doctrinal template, they elevated
African customary law to global relevance. They set it on a
modernization path similar in design to that of Anglo-American law
78. ELIAS, supra note 3.
79. Allott, supra note 22.
80. Ajayi, supra note 48. But see Virginia Edith Wamboi Otieno v. Joash Ochieng
Ougo and Omolo Siranga, (1987) 1 K.A.R. 1049 (Kenya).
81. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SItCLE (1998).
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by linking it to post-World War II global sensibility about the rule of
law, human rights, and economic development, as depicted in the
chart above. While this may seem typical, third world family law is
always under the international legal microscope, often unstated is its
ability to absorb the effects of global economic dysfunction and
actualize market certainty in the process.
C. Doctrinal Staging II: From Restatement to Casebook on
African Customary Law
Professors Cotran and Allott undertook the Restatement Project
because they did not think that anthropological works of the first
half of the twentieth century had produced an authoritative
statement of customary law useable by modern courts.82 They also
faulted colonial courts for not producing an accurate customary law.
Neither one, anthropological accounts nor decisions of colonial
courts, could be relied upon as authoritative. Professor Dennis
Cowen, a professor of law at the University of Chicago and director
of its Center for Legal Research in New Nations described the work
at hand as follows:
It is one thing, for example, to say that various systems of
"customary law" operate in Africa; it is quite another to ascertain
with precision what rules these systems prescribe, and what are
the similarities and differences between the systems themselves.
Precise ground work of this kind is difficult and laborious, but
essential. It is essential because where, as is often the case, it is
sought to change or build upon a customary institution, one
should know exactly what one is dealing with. It is difficult work
because ... customary law often lacks, or defies circumscription
within, a formal or conceptual framework, and, further, what is
called "customary law" in Africa is often in the process of rapid
change - changing, in fact, while the work of recording goes on.
Fortunately, this work is now being undertaken, on a broad scale,
under the direction of Dr. A N Allott at the School of Oriental and
African Studies in London.83
After writing the Restatements for various countries, Cotran became
the secretary to Kenya's Commission on the Law of Marriage and
Divorce and the Commission on the Law of Succession. These were
the first comprehensive family law reform efforts by the Kenyan
government with the mandate to recommend as far as practicable a
82. Cotran, supra note 7. For a critique of this position, see Annelise Riles, supra note 42.
83. Denis V. Cowen, African Legal Studies - A Survey of the Field and the Role of the
United States, in AFRICAN LAW: NEW LAW FOR NEW NATIONS 9, 15 (Hans Wolfgang Baade
ed., 1963).
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uniform family law code that would apply to all Kenyans.
Subsequently, he served as a judge of the High Court of Kenya
between 1977 and 1982. He presided over several important
customary law cases, in some instances following the Restatements
he had written. He published in 1987 the Casebook on Kenya
Customary Law (hereafter the Casebook), a collection of customary law
cases decided by the highest courts in Kenya adhering to common
law methods of adjudication. From reader in African Law at SOAS,
to colonial/postcolonial law reform expert, to Kenya high court
judge, Cotran weaved a long and distinguished career, outstanding
for traversing wide terrain using comparative law methodology.
Even though cast as a modest effort to make customary law
ascertainable by courts, the restatement project was much more.
Consider the law of marriage as presented in the Casebook - we
learn that a customary marriage must have certain key elements to
be valid and the work of courts is to declare when parties have
adduced sufficient evidence to establish those elements. It tells us
that capacity and consent to marry are the two elements common to
all ethnic groups for a marriage to be valid. Being general and
universal, the two elements qualify to be rules of a uniform Kenya
family law. Let us call them core rules. Various ethnic groups have
additional requirements for a valid marriage that are unique to
them. For the Kikuyu, the Casebook lists ngurario (slaughtering of a
ram), ruracio (dowry), and the commencement of cohabitation, as
the three additional elements of a valid Kikuyu marriage. Let us call
these unique extra elements peripheral rules. They are
distinguishable from core rules because courts may modify, or in
appropriate cases, abolish them with little loss to the integrity of
customary law. There is an implicit assumption that the more a rule
is unique to a particular tribe, the greater the likelihood that it is
repugnant to justice, inconsistent with modern law, unnecessary, or
inconvenient to national interests, specifically integration and
harmonization interests, and thus by this criteria it should be in the
second category.
Dowry, animal slaughter, and cohabitation are marriage
requirements that by virtue of not being uniformly required by all
ethnic communities, bear ceremonial qualities, and are therefore
flexible, fluid, malleable, variable, and ultimately peripheral. When
litigated in a modem postcolonial court, these rules should be
subject to judicial discretion, and when the subject of legislative
reform, they could be reduced to insignificance, accorded a
respectful nod, or abolished. Moreover, they are best left in the
realm of individual choice rather than prescription. Their
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observance, partial observance, or non-observance should not affect
the validity of marriage if not followed to the letter or if not followed
at all. Their value as rules that define marriage in the national legal
order therefore significantly reduces.
This organization of marriage law into core and peripheral rules
makes African customary and Anglo-American thinking about
marriage validity seamless. It is a conceptual bridge linking the two,
especially useful in transition periods where citizens are likely to be
in marriages that have elements of more than one regime. It is also a
realist framework. Judges sit to decide cases on a spectrum of rigid
to flexible rule interpretation, and there is a fair amount of
uncertainty involved in litigating each case.84
The classification of an element as core or peripheral is
obviously a political decision someone in Cotran's position makes.
For example, although dowry among the Kikuyu signifies the
consent of both the individuals marrying and their families, consent
being a core rule in Cotran's scheme, he treated it as a wholly
peripheral rule. He justified this by pointing out that dowry though
common is not universally practiced, and further, missionaries,
feminists, and progressives were united in seeking its abolition for
being a violation of women's human rights. Cotran's severance of
consent from dowry illustrates how the dual structure he created
would work - courts and legislatures can modify or expunge
peripheral rules without guilt of destroying customary law, without
interfering with the heart of the modern law of marriage, and
without committing treason against African national pride.
That Cotran's rule structure favors individual freedom and
comports with the law of the market and international human rights
is undeniable. Stripping consent off dowry consigns it to the
periphery of family law and has the effect of minimizing the role of
the community in formal marriage validation. Armed with the will
and capacity to marry, individuals may but do not have to meet
unreasonable demands of family and community assembled in
marriage validating negotiations. In fact, these become more of
conversations than negotiations, an important cultural shift. Dowry
no longer signifies consent, it is merely ceremonial, done at the
election of the parties, a dying practice probably. The core of the
African customary marriage is now the same as that of the
European, with allowance for peripheral embellishment and
84. Kennedy, supra note 81; K. N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE
CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (U. of Okia.
Press 1941); K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS Study (Oceana
Pub. 1960).
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differentiation. Practice affirms this approach for postcolonial courts
have since interpreted dowry, and other peripheral requirements,
flexibly, and law reform activists have endorsed its abolition or
modification.85
In conclusion, socio-legal reformers of mid-twentieth century
produced a postcolonial family law regime that was compatible with
market development and international human rights as policy
aspirations that were to be balanced against local circumstances.
They did this by excavating individualism from unwritten African
customary law rather than by importing it readymade from Western
codes. They kept the label "customary marriage" even though its
doctrinal core was ultimately similar to that of statutory marriages to
signal community distance from the state characteristic of legal
pluralism. At the same time, they put customary law in a form
usable by courts and strangers to ensure doctrinal evolution in
tandem with the law of the market, constitutional governance, and
social change. In the next Part, I discuss the import of what they did
in the terms of legal diffusion theory.
III. Diffusion of Law and the Production of
National Family Law Regimes
Amidst persistent calls by academics, international
organizations, governments, and civil society groups for abolition or
radical reform of the customary form of marriage, one can lose sight
of the fact that legal professionals and state bureaucrats have with
equal persistence worked to give this form of marriage a modern
doctrinal character. Though extensively maligned, as many as 80%
of marriages in West Africa, for example, are contracted under
customary law.86 False consciousness cannot explain a number so
high. For better or worse, I think the formal and substantive
doctrinal sophistication of customary law discussed above provides
a better explanation for its prevalence.
Postcolonial marriage law reform in Africa has been moving in
two opposite directions, it seems, and that is why customary
marriage is simultaneously contentious and prevalent. Reform
advocates who believe that customary law impinges on individual
rights and perpetuates patriarchal oppression of African women
tend to think customary law is a personal system of law that governs
85. Cotran, supra note 7, at 31.
86. WOMEN AND THE LAW IN WEST AFRICA: GENDER RELATIONS IN THE FAMILY - A
WEST AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (Akua Kuenyehia ed., 2003).
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the private sphere of intimate relationships.87 They have wanted
laws that will make this sphere more equitable, resisting the idea
that the customary cultural sphere should remain closed to state
intervention and westernization.88 They have employed strategies
such as questioning the authenticity of customary law by describing
it as a colonial and postcolonial elite construct wielded to fend off
modernization forces and to retain traditional power systems that
are oppressive and retrogressive.89
A separate category of reform advocates sees customary law as
a legal regime that defies characterization as private, familial, or
personal. They understand it to be unofficial or nonstate law and are
concerned about problems of legal pluralism such as the threat
disharmony poses to national economic and social reconstruction 90
or to the administration of justice,91 and ultimately to the legitimacy
of law. 92 They think the solution to these problems lies in the
87. BANDA, supra note 7.
88. J. Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, "The Personal is Political," or Why Women's
Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism, 17 HUM.
RTS. Q. 691 (1995).
89. Martin Chanock, Neither Customary nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of
Family Law Reform, 3 INTL J. L. & FAM. 72 (1989).
90. A. N. Allott, What Is to Be Done with African Customary Law - The Experience of
Problems and Reforms in Anglophone Africa from 1950, 28 J. AFR. L. 56 (1984); David N.
Smith, Man and Law in Urban Africa: A Role for Customary Courts in the Urbanization
Process, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 223 (1972); James S. Read, Crime and Punishment in East Africa:
The Twilight of Customary Law, 10 HOWARD L.J. 164 (1964). Lynn Berat & Robert J.
Gordon, Customary Law in Namibia: What Should be Done?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 633
(1991); Lynn Berat, Customary Law in a New South Africa: A Proposal, 15 FORDHAM INTL L.
J. 92 (1991-1992).
91. Gordon R. Woodman, Legal Pluralism and the Search for Justice, 40 J. Afr. L. 152
(1996); Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation - Recent Debate
About Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 21 (1998); Vice President
Akua Kuenyehia, Women, Marriage, and Intestate Succession in the Context of Legal Pluralism
in Africa, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 385 (2006-2007); Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse, and
Customary Law in Africa, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 509 (2009-2010); Johanna Bond, Pluralism in
Ghana: The Perils and Promise of Parallel Law, 10 OR. REV. INT'L L. 391 (2008); Allison D.
Kent, Custody, Maintenance, and Succession: The Internalization of Women's and Children's
Rights under Customary Law in Africa, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 507 (2006-2007); Brenda
Oppermann, Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women's Status: An Examination of Marriage Laws
in Egypt, South Africa, and the United States, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 65 (2006); Anne
Hellum, Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Options and Limits for the
Subjects of Legal Pluralism, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 635 (2000).
92. WILLIAM BURNET HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA, IN INTEGRATION
OF CusrOMARY AND MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICA (University of Ife, 1971):
The problems of relating legal norms ... arise from the fact that the legal
order in Ghana is in a special sense pluralistic, encompassing not merely
law derived from the former colonial power, now greatly supplemented by
post-independence legislation, and a system of courts to apply that law, but
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doctrinal systematization of all legal regimes whether officially or
unofficially organized.93  Their reform agenda involves
indiscriminate diffusion of legal thought and legal techniques to
streamline each regime to make it administrable by modern courts
and adaptable to national modernization programs and international
human rights standards.94
These two ideas reflect a split in conceptualization of the family
and the state in international legal understanding. If customary law
is simply family law rather than unofficial law, it poses no threat to
state sovereignty, it is supremely domestic, and therefore peripheral
in importance.95 On the other hand, if customary law is unofficial
law, it limits the reach of state sovereign power and may affect the
performance of the public international legal regime.96 On this score,
comparative law and society theorists challenge the premises of legal
positivism, which accords the state exclusive law making and
enforcement power, as undermining our ability to understand the
true nature of law.97 The viable existence of unofficial law shows
that the link between family and state cannot be severed, the two are
governance institutions, and are mutually constitutive. Developing
unofficial law and adopting it to national and international
governance aspirations does not embolden the sphere of private
intimacy any more than if it was left untouched, and is beneficial to
the modern state in the long run.
Countries such as South Africa recently followed the second line
of thought and passed legislation to recognize the customary form of
marriage.98  Their courts will have to resolve constitutional
also a body, or more properly, bodies of indigenous or customary law
applied mainly in the Native, now Local, Courts. To avoid chaos, some
scheme was necessary to delimit the sphere of operation of each body of
law and each system of courts and, insofar as these spheres coincided or
conflicted, to determine which should prevail.
HARVEY, supra note 92, at 239-40.
93. Woodman, supra note 59.
94. Rheinstein, supra note 1. Robert B. Seidman, Law and Economic Development in
Independent, English-Speaking, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 999 (1966).
95. Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies
and Contemporary Studies ofFamily Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010).
96. Kennedy, supra note 43.
97. Riles, supra note 42; WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT:
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA (2006); Ralf Michaels, The Re-Statement of Non-
State Law: The State, Choice of law, and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE
L. REV. 1209 (2005).
98. J. M. Peinaar, African Customary Wives in South Afica: Is There Spousal Equality after
the Commencement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 14 STELLENBOSCH L. REV.
256 (2003). Mothokoa Mamashela, New Families, New Property, New Laws: The Practical
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challenges to such statutes and formulate pragmatic solutions to the
issues of gender equality and discrimination they raise.99 If faced
with a case that invites conceptualization of customary law as family
law, rather than a form of nonstate law, for instance where a
claimant seeks protection from domestic violence, they are bound to
adopt the first line of thought, that customary law is merely a
personal law system, and to invoke principles of individual freedom,
liberty and dignity to pronounce its reform. In a case inviting
conceptualization of customary law as unofficial law, on the other
hand, courts will likely decide on a theory of nonstate normative
orders assuming their rightful place in a plural democracy.
The African/Western colonial encounter at many levels
involves conceptual and moral subjugation, and imposition of
interpretative and reasoning techniques. At the heart of this violent
encounter is conceptual determinism, the need to found
jurisdictional authority on general determinations about how each
society through its laws or customs regards the individual. If
customary law tends to subordinate the individual to the family, and
the family system it espouses has extensive normative and
distributive functions, it poses a serious challenge to the colonial and
postcolonial pursuit of market-based development. The only thing
that saves customary law from complete abolition by the state is
proof of its utility as a tool for positive bureaucratic governance, that
is, utility beyond the sphere of family.100 To have this type of utility,
customary law must become individualistic and must transform the
family to release resources to individual control and market
exchange. The customary form of family hinders the development
of the modern state not because it sanctions patriarchy and morally
contentious cultural practices but because these practices are
wedded to control and access to resources.101
Conceiving the pre-modern family as having no private core the
liberal state is obligated to protectl02 justifies the diffusion of western
law to provide the missing private in remote parts of the world and
makes customary law a logical target of such a mission. However,
the reconceptualization of the customary family by socio-legal
Effects of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 20 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs 616 (2004).
99. Jill Zimmerman, The Reconstitution of Customary Law in South Africa: Method and
Discourse, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 197 (2001).
100. Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmerman eds., 2006).
101. Kerry Rittich, Black Sites: Locating the Family and Family Law in Development, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 1023 (2010).
102. Marella, supra note 2.
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reformers alters the channels of legal diffusion. Instead of the
traditional western imposition geared at subordinating family to
market, community to individual, there is cross-fertilization and
counteraction horizontally across regimes of law and vertically from
state policy to legal regime as necessary to encourage the emergence
of a national legal order.
Although socio-legal reformers "discover" the economic
character of customary law, it remains an irrational scheme of law
unless its subject matter is organized to fit known Anglo-American
family law headings and its development entrusted to common law
judges who will decide whether and how to expand these foreign
doctrinal casings to accommodate local eccentric matter.103 They will
also have the discretion to transfer more and more Western laws and
schemes of legal thought into the customary realm, and to turn the
flow of influence in the opposite direction.104
Although proponents of this integrative legal pluralism reject
classical positivism's position that the law is autonomous, the decision
to integrate customary law into the national schemes of economic laws
means they must positivize and bureaucratize it. Repackaging
customary law as useful to actors in modem economies gives it a role
far superior to that of impassioned ethno-national identity assertion. Of
course, reformers cannot predetermine whether customary law will
play the first or the second role once developed. The production of
national family law regimes in many countries has involved political
compromises that have relegated the family to the second role to make
the transplantation of other private laws politically acceptable.105
Taking Cotran's charge to modernize customary law, family law
courts have engaged in active cross-fertilization of customary and
western derived laws, but the allure of individualism and market
development has preserved the latter at the top of the hierarchy of
national laws. To resolve conflicts pitting tradition against modernity,
courts have become crucibles for two-way legal diffusion. They are
integrating customary and modem legal rules and concepts, and
diminishing the hold the African/Western individualism/community
conceptual divide has had in family law adjudication and national
politics. I illustrate how this is the case below.
103. Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or
Max Weber's Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought,
55 HASTINGs L. J. 1031 (2003-2004).
104. Marella, supra note 2; William Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47
HARV. INT'L L. J. 507 (2006).
105. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 21, 53, 63; Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim
Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043 (2004).
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A. Eccentric Claims in a Modern Era
The cases I discuss in this and the next section involve conflicts
over resources believed to be under the control of the customary
family. The courts must decide whether those resources will remain
there or will be released to private market actors. The courts have
ruled in both directions. In some cases, they have used customary
law to modernize received laws that embolden customary
patriarchy, but in others, they have done the opposite.
In one case, a young female sued her schoolteacher after "he
had impregnated her but refused to marry her". Unlike western
law, customary law did not recognize a cause of action for a breach
of promise to marry, but recognized an action for loss of virginity
and pregnancy compensation where a man did not marry a female
he impregnated. Sitting as an appellate judge and invoking his
authorship of the Restatements of African Law, Cotran sidestepped
legal technicality to eliminate the distinction between modern and
customary causes of action, allowing the girl to recover under
customary law rules even though her cause of action derived from
English law. Lower courts had ruled that a schoolgirl suing her
teacher claiming that he had impregnated her but "rejected her for a
wife" and that "her future chances in life had been jeopardized by
the act of the defendant" was entitled to Kenya Shillings 1,000/ in
damages. On appeal, Cotran upheld the award observing:
The question remains ... what is the basis for the award of shs.
1,000/= in compensation. Mr. Mukele argues forcefully that
under Luhya customary law, which is applicable in this case, there
is no action for a breach of promise to marry and he refers to Vol. 1
of the Restatement of African Law: The Law of Marriage and
Divorce of which I happen to be the unfortunate author. I am, of
course, prepared to accept that this is the true position under
Luhya customary law but when one turns to p. 55 of the same
publication, one finds that under Luhya customary law, provision
is made for compensation for having sexual intercourse with an
unmarried girl resulting in the loss of her virginity, that
compensation therefor is one heifer and it is payable to the girl's
father; and also there is provision for payment of pregnancy
compensation - again to the girl's father - of one heifer. False I
am informed, and I have no reason to doubt, that the average price
of a heifer in the locality from which the parties come is in the
region of shs. 500/= each and, therefore, it seems to me that even if
I look at the strict customary law and accept it as applicable in the
circumstances of this case, the net result would be precisely the
same.106
106. COTRAN, supra note 7, at 3-4 (Mamati).
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In a move that would seem to embolden customary patriarchy,
Cotran then ruled that the fact that customary law remedies were
payable to the father of the girl rather than to the girl, the plaintiff in
the suit, was a technicality that could not defeat the claim.
His ruling is interesting at many levels. First, he refused to
allow a legal technicality to forestall recovery by equating the
English idea of breach of promise to marry with the customary law
loss of virginity and pregnancy compensation causes of action.
Noting that the Affiliation Act, which would have required payment
of child support by a child's father, had been abolished in Kenya at
the time, he signaled courts should act where the legislature had
failed to do so. He thus used customary law to advance a just
outcome where the tools of modern law were besieged by legal
technicality and legislative impasse. In taking this approach, he
overturned long held biases against customary law's fairness as
compared to statutory law.
Cotran's award of the monetary equivalent of a customary
heifer presents some fascinating complexities. It was consistent with
his commitment to making customary law adaptable to changed
conditions. A heifer is fungible; with the monetary award, the
plaintiff was free to acquire another in the marketplace. Monetizing
customary law compensation was convenient and ultimately
efficient. However, if one looks at pregnancy compensation as being
about repairing frayed community relationships rather than
remedying computable loss, Cotran's innovation actually
discouraged community members from judicial dispute resolution,
something he had worked had to promote.107 If redressing loss and
addressing legislative impasse was the issue, then the man should
have been liable for much more.
Yet, monetizing damages reduced community control over the
individual by lessening the sense that the grievance was about
violation of family honor after the loss of virginity of an unmarried
girl. At the same time, by not taking issue with a father taking
compensation owed a daughter, Cotran paid homage to the
communitarian ethic in most family law regimes, even though his
alternate posture was to advocate reform of African customary law
to reflect the emerging reality of heightened individualism.
Mamati demonstrates a deep anxiety that monetization changes
107. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to
Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 791 (1994-1995);
Igor Kopytoff, The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process, in THE SOCIAL
LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 64 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1986).
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the meaning of important customary law questions such as whether
the purpose of customary legal process is to make the individual
whole or to restore harmonious community relations; whether
dowry as an element of a valid customary law marriage amounts to
wife purchase or to community ratification of the new union.108 By
equating English breach of promise to marry with loss of virginity
and pregnancy compensation actions, and by approving settlement
to the plaintiff's father rather than to the plaintiff herself, Cotran's
doctrinal template retained communitarian elements in a modem
family law schema.
B. Marriage Law and Economic Development
The development of family law in Africa correlates directly with
the development of the modern state, which pursues market-based
development by forcing the release of resources controlled by the
customary family to private market actors. The route to this model
of development is through the systemic transformation of customary
family law. The idea is to move societies broadly categorized as pre-
modern and traditional from status to contract.109 This Article helps
us understand how diffusion of legal thought simultaneously
enables and frustrates this pursuit.
The treatment the claimant's father received in Mamati is very
different from the treatment heads of households embroiled in land
disputes with married women have received. Many customary
heads of households became registered titleholders of what had
always been commonly owned as family property. Courts had to
decide whether registered title gave them exclusive property rights
over such land and extinguished preexisting customary law
interests. Registered title was favored by the state because it
increased rural agricultural production which in turn supported of
import substitution economies, scheme that feminists criticized as
subsidizing patriarchy and male ownership of resources.110 This
initial advantage served the new class of titled individual
landowners well. They could access finance markets using land as
collateral in ways that other members of the family unit could not.
This reduced such family members to dependency and turned them
into a source of cheap labor on land that they previously owned
108. BANDA, supra note 7 (many meanings of dowry).
109. Joel M. Ngugi, Forgetting Lochner in the Journey from Plan to Market: The Framing
Effect of the Market Rhetoric in Market Oriented Reforms, 56 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (2008).
110. ESTER BOSERUP, WOMAN'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2007); Celestine
L. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of
Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT'L L. J. 381 (2000).
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under customary law.
Further, by becoming land titleholders, heads of households
also became owners of produce harvested from the land, which if
customary law governed, would be family property commonly held.
They earned revenue from state corporations that purchased and
sold agricultural produce at international markets. They did not
share that revenue with dependent family members who had rights
to the land under customary law but not under statutory law. As
with marriage went property, modern property law encouraged
Africans to substitute the identity of family head with that of
individual entrepreneur. They took out mortgages against title they
had acquired in the new legal system. When banks sought to
foreclose on unpaid loans, family members not listed in those deeds
argued that they had cognizable legal interests in the property under
customary law that prevented foreclosure.
Courts invented the African customary trust doctrine to resolve
such cases in favor of customary claimants whether or not their
names appeared on title deeds used to secure the loans.'1 ' In this
way, courts modified modern property law's exclusive ownership
provisions, in much the same way that marital property statutes
have done in the West. But they did not stop there. The African
customary trust doctrine served as a double-edged sword. It
modified customary primogeniture rules. In succession matters,
first-born male relatives would hold family property in trust for
dependent family members even where such property had been
registered to them only. Unmarried women and "illegitimate"
children were particularly vulnerable and benefited from this
judicial supplementation of customary law with English equitable
trust doctrine.
Another instance of supplementation was the use of the English
doctrine of presumption of marriage to find a marriage in cases of
long cohabitation. If a couple had established a reputation within
the community of being married and had showed an intent to be
considered married, the courts presumed a marriage.112 To the
courts, a couple's expression of intent fulfilled the individualist
aspirations of Cotran's modem family law schema while the
reputation requirement paid homage to the role of the community in
validating marriage. It fit Cotran's scheme perfectly. It is important
to contextualize judicial invocation of this doctrine. Once heads of
111. COTRAN, supra note 7.
112. Hortensiah Wanjiku Yawe v. Public Trustee, Court of Appeal for East Africa,
Civil Appeal No. 13 of 1976; COTRAN, supra note 7, at 63.
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households began to assert exclusive individual title to land,
dependent family members were forced out of land and had to
migrate to urban centers in search of employment. The hardship
caused by migration delayed or prevented full compliance with the
formal requirements of customary marriage law, especially
requirements and rituals that required extensive community
participation. For instance, relationships fell apart before dowry had
been paid but after prolonged cohabitation. If courts refused to find
a marriage for want of form, weaker parties who tended to be
women, would miss the protections afforded by the law of divorce.
Sometimes an individual married under customary law moved to an
urban center and purported to marry another woman under
religious or civil law. In a dispute between the "certificate" wife and
the customary wife, say for a share of family property upon divorce
or death of the man, arguing presumption of marriage was handy
for the latter and her children.113
So long as a woman had surmounted challenges to her status as
wife, whether by successfully establishing the elements of a valid
marriage or by persuading a court to presume a marriage from long
cohabitation and community reputation, the English Married
Women's Property Rights Act, one among many received foreign
statutes protected her marital property. This statute has been
interpreted as overriding inconsistent customary laws.114 Married
women fighting heads of households for control of family property
can marshal it instead of or together with the African customary
trust doctrine. Customary laws did not provide uniform rules on
what share of family property married women and women generally
were entitled to.115 This statute not only removed such disputes
from the domain of customary law, and of "culture," it also made it
possible for courts to expand married women's property rights.116
Notice that while the African customary trust doctrine protects
women and other dependants against individualizing heads of
households on a theory of common property, the Married Women's
Property Rights Act protects them on the basis of individual rights to
property acquired during marriage. This statute may override
113. BANDA, supra note 7. Most countries have now decoupled marriage and
succession to allow all children inheritance rights regardless of the marital status of their
parents.
114. BANDA, supra note 7.
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certain customary law rules but in the end seems to complement
customary law. Although it is a colonial statute received during an
era of nonrecognition of customary marriage, its indiscriminate
application validates customary marriages and puts them at par
with civil marriages. It treats women married under various
regimes equally. Its application serves to transcend the African/
Western conceptual albatross in comparative family law.
Cotran's framework allows courts to intermingle customary and
western marriage law rules. Customary law receives a reputational
boost when courts invoke it to reform western law or when western
law confirms that it is sensible, reasonable or rational by validating
its provisions. Customary law returns the favor by offering a view
of the family as a zone of economic activity that needs market-type
distribution fairness rules to assure equitable gender and parental
relations. Customary law can therefore contribute to the
demarginalization of family law. In performing this function, it self-
demarginalizes, and sets out to escape being a tool of the assertion of
cultural hegemony.
Conclusion
The diffusion of Anglo-American classical legal thought to Africa
through colonial domination and other methods of influence
established a hierarchical relationship of center and periphery with
regard to forms and sources of legal authority, but legal thought
progressed over time towards the social view of law, changing the
terms of center/periphery correspondence and flow of legal influence.
The global expansion of classical conceptual dichotomies reproduced
in the periphery crises of governance and legitimacy legal
professionals in the center were grappling with, and the emergence of
common social problems made the divide between the west and the
rest redundant, exposing conceptual dichotomization as a political
tool rather than an accurate representation of the natural composition
of western legal institutions. This in turn precipitated the quest for
social and political transformation in both the center and the
periphery.1"7 Modern African marriage law is a product of this
process of global introspection and diffusion of legal ideas.
Consequently, marriage law reform in Africa will continue to
simultaneously weaken and affirm the customary form of marriage.
Already, the trend is to affirm, simultaneously, individual rights and
the right to culture in various laws and national constitutions.118 As
117. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 46-50.
118. Thanda Nhlapo, The Afican Customary Law of Marriage and the Rights
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global economic integration intensifies, states and markets will
continue to wrestle the customary family for control of resources and
the place of customary marriage in the national legal system will
continue to be questioned and adjusted. Marriage may very well be
conceived as a conflict between state, family, and markets for
governance and redistribution power; or it may be regarded as a
zone for conflicts over private property rights, individual freedom,
and human rights, that have nothing to do with the configuration of
social institutions. If this turns out to be the case, pragmatic
balancing of competing interests, another staple of Anglo-American
legal thought, will be the next wave of legal diffusion in Africa. Its
effect will be to impose on courts a doctrinal framework that adopts
the technique of balancing individual rights against community
interests and that prioritizes reasonableness analysis over categorical
rules. Integrative legal pluralism is on the march but it is not clear
what the future of marriage law in Africa will be.
Conundrum, in BEYOND RIGHTS AND CULTURE TALK: COMPARATIVE ESSAYS ON THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS AND CULTURE 136 (Mahmood Mamdani ed., 2000).
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